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ZAHN v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER: TAKING THE
ACTION OUT OF CLASS ACTION, OR
CAN ZAHN BE AVOIDED?
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision last term in Zahn v. International
Paper Co.' was greeted in the news media with prophecies of doom
for class actions brought in federal court.2 Though the media's
concern was earnest, upon closer inspection, Zahn does not nearly
have such a virulent effect. There is little doubt, however, that
Zahn will be a serious hurdle to many class action litigants in fed-
eral court.
In Zahn four owners of property fronting on Lake Champlain
in Orwell, Vermont, brought a diversity action in federal district
court seeking 40 million dollars in compensatory and punitive dam-
ages on behalf of themselves and 200 other similarly situated land-
owners and lessees. Defendant was a New York corporation, oper-
ating a pulp and paper-making plant in New York state which al-
legedly allowed discharges from that plant to enter the lake's wa-
ters. The district court,3 in reliance upon the Supreme Court's
earlier decision in Snyder v. Harris,4 declined to permit the action
to proceed as a class action under Rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
1. .414 U.S. 291 (1973).
2. Los Angeles Times, Dec. 18, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 3; Wall Street Jour-
nal, Dec. 18, 1973, at 12, col. 2.
3. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
4. 394U.S. 332 (1969).
5. Rule 23 provides in pertinent part:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained
as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied,
and in addition:(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to indi-
vidual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the inter-
ests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or sub-
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The Snyder decision prohibited the named parties to a class ac-
tion from aggregating their claims to meet the 10,000 dollar amount
in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)6 except where
the parties were exercising a joint or common right.7 The district
court reluctantly concluded that the Snyder rationale must also ap-
ply to non-named parties and after finding that some of the class
members' claims would amount to less than 10,000 dollars, dis-
missed all save the named parties, each of whom met the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement. Upon interlocutory appeal, a divided
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.8 On certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the decision was affirmed 6 to 3.
It is quite likely that Zahn will not be greeted with a flood of
enthusiasm, if comments written in response to the Second Circuit
decision are indicative.9 The Court's reasoning will surely be de-
bated and questioned, but the legal profession will likely have to
live with Zahn for the forseeable future. Because Zahn may be
stantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
or (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds'generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropri-
ate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affect-
ing only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already com-
menced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
6. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(l) Citi-
zens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1966).
7. See text accompanying note 44, infra.
8. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
9. See Comment, Zahn v. International Paper: A Further Limitation on
Class Action Jurisdiction, 41 FoRDHAm L. REV. 991 (1973); Case Comment,
4 LOYOLA U.L. Rv. 531 (1973); Case Note, 9 HousToN L. REV. 852 (1972);
Case Note, 39 J. AI & COMMERCE 289 (1973); Recent Developments, 73
COLuM. L. REv. 359 (1973); Recent Developments, 61 GEO. L.J. 1327 (1973);
Recent Decisions, 7 GEORGrA L. REv. 390 (1973); Recent Developments, 6 IN-
DIANAL. REv. 812 (1973).
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more the product of a distrust of class actions10 than the result of
sound legal theory, this comment will not attempt a discourse on
the rationale of the decision.1' Instead the discussion to follow is
devoted to delving into the practical implications of Zahn and con-
sidering methods of avoiding its impact.
THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF Zahn
Class Actions Unaffected by Zahn
Zahn is hardly a death knell to all class actions. Jurisdiction
was established in Zahn by general diversity under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a) which requires the amount in controversy to be at least
10,000 dollars. The Court's holding that each of the named and un-
named parties in such a suit must have a 10,000 dollar claim was
also made applicable to cases based on general federal question
jurisdiction12 under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)13 which likewise requires
a 10,000 dollar amount in controversy. Zahn is inapplicable, how-
ever, to those suits arising under a federal statute which does not
require the existence of a minimum amount in controversy. Thus
a wide range of federal causes of action, which are noted below,1 4
avoid the Zahn restriction.
10. See, e.g., Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction,
55 F.R.D. 375 (1972).
11. The Zahn dissenters presented a cogent rationale for permitting ag-
gregation of the class claims. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 302
(1973) (dissenting opinion). Probably the most cogent rationale is as fol-
lows: (1) The non-named parties need meet the general diversity require-
ment, which has Constitutional underpinnings. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (a) (1966); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356
(1921). (2) The prohibition against aggregation is not specifically estab-
lished by statute, but the statute relied upon for this rule also specifically
requires diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1966); Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). (3) Since the diversity requirement has consti-
tutional underpinnings but can be relaxed, so should the rule against aggre-
gation, which is based on mere statutory interpretation.
12. 414 U.S. at 294-95.
13. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Con-
stitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1966).
14. Zahn does not apply to cases based on the following statutes: Admir-
alty, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1966); Bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1962); Review
of Interstate Commerce Commission orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (Supp. 1974);
Statutes regulating commerce, 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1962); Patent, plant vari-
ety, trademark and copyright, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (Supp. 1974); Postal matters,
28 U.S.C. § 1339 (1962); Internal revenue, 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1962); Civil
rights matters, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1962); Election disputes, 28 U.S.C. § 1344
(1962); Cases wherein the United States is a party, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345-49
(1962, Supp. 1974), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1357-58 (1962), 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp.
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In most cases the class litigant should find a particular federal
statute is either clearly applicable or clearly inapplicable. In some
cases, however, the question of applicability is not so easily an-
swered. This fact can be demonstrated by examining the possibil-
ity of finding a federal cause of action having no jurisdictional
amount requirement under which the Zahn case could have been
brought.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871
Where the defendant is a governmental entity15 or official'8 or
some closely regulated industry,'7 counsel should consider bringing
a cause of action based upon violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, I 8 which does not require an amount in controversy.' 9 To as-
1974); Alien's action for certain torts, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1962); Cases against
consuls, 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1962); Actions on bonds executed under federal
law, 28 U.S.C. § 1352 (1962); Indian allotments, 28 U.S.C. § 1353 (1962);
Cases involving land grants from different states, 28 U.S.C. § 1354 (1962);
Cases on recovery of federal fines and seizures, 28 U.S.C. § 1355-56 (1962);
Cases brought by Indian Tribes, 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (Supp. 1974).
15. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
16. E.g., Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973) [state prison per-
sonnel]; Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1973) [state registrar of
motor vehicles]; Gill v. Manuel, 488 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1973) [policemen].
17. E.g., cases cited note 25, infra.
18. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974).
19. At one time a personal-property right dichotomy affected jurisdiction.
Claims for deprivation of personal rights were said to meet the require-
ments for the independent basis for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1962), while claims based on property rights were required to meet the
amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1966). See Com-
ment, Federal Jurisdiction Under the Civil Rights Act-The Case Against
the Personal-Property Rights Distinction, 17 VILL. L. REV. 313 (1971); Com-
ment, Section 1343 of Title 28-Is the Application of the "Civil Rights-Prop-
erty Rights" Distinction to Deny Jurisdiction Still Viable?, 49 B.U.L. REV.
377 (1969). This distinction was rejected in Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972), however, because of some dicta in Lynch, it is
unclear whether it is still necessary to satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement in suits against federal officials. Strausberg, The Jurisdictional
Amount Requirement and Actions to Enjoin Deprivation of Constitutional
Rights by Federal Officials: The Lynching Effect, 17 HOWARD L.J. 867
(1973).
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sert a cause of action under this statute, it must be proved that (1)
the defendant took certain actions under color or authority of state
law which (2) deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right.20
Of course, the right not to be deprived of -property, except by due
process of law, is one such right.21
Although the following discussion examines the potentiality for
applying this statute to a pollution oriented claim, the sweeping
language of the provision is hardly so limited. The number of suits
brought under the Act are on the increase; apparently the legal
profession is becoming more aware of the great breadth of actions
which it covers. 22 In the commercial area, most of the litigation
under this statute involving the deprivation of property rights, has
been directed toward public utilities; probably because close regu-
lation of public utilities heightens the probability of finding state
action. The Surpreme Court has not precisely defined what state
action is in this context, but has told us:
Conduct that is "private" may become so entwined with govern-
mental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character
as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon
state action.23
Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonob-
vious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its
true significance.24
With this direction, the lower federal courts have ruled both ways
on the question whether state regulation of public utilities amounts
to state action.25
The split in the lower federal courts surfaces on the question
whether (1) state action requires an overt state act endorsing the
20. See Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 479 F.2d 153, 161 (6th Cir. 1973).
21. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67(1972). This theory has not, however, fared well in environmentally ori-
ented lawsuits. See Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061(N.D.W.V. 1973); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex.
1972).
22. In 1962 about one percent of all the Federal District Court opinions
filed concerned actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974). In 1973 it
was closer to ten percent.
23. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
24. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
25. Cases finding state action include: Palmer v. Columbia Gas Inc., 470
F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566(8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Salisbury v. Southern New
England Telephone Co., 365 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Conn. 1973); Stanford v. Gas
Service Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972). Cases finding no state action
include: Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973);
Lucas v. Wisconsin Elect. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Particular Cleaners, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edi-
son Co., 457 F.2d 189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 890 (1972).
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complained of activity or whether (2) the existence of state ad-
ministrative control over the activities of a monopoly, while not
specifically permitting the complained of activity, also constitutes
state action. Apparently, most courts are willing to adopt the first
proposition,2 6 while fewer courts will adopt the second.
2
"
There is no theoretical reason why the foregoing state action
analysis is not equally applicable to an enterprise other than a pub-
lic utility, such as a pulp and paper mill. The state action require-
ment might be readily established under the first proposition, for
instance, if the state has adopted allowable discharge limits for pol-
lutants and the enterprise has complied with those limits. 28  This,
of course, assumes that the state has selected inappropriately high
limits, 29 which should be an infrequent occurrence. More com-
monly, however, the state will have either established no limits or
reasonable limits, and there thus will be either no damage or no
state action. There would be no state action even under the more
liberal definition since a pulp and paper mill is just not character-
izable as a state authorized monopoly. Thus, the possibility of find-
ing a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act is possible, but un-
likely in the case of a corporate polluter.
Another Basis for Jurisdiction
If, on the other hand, the polluter allows pollutants at greater
than allowable levels to enter navigable interstate waters, then the
26. E.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Jack-
son v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973); Lucas v. Wis-
consin Elect. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1114 (1973); Particular Cleaners, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 457
F.2d 189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 890 (1972). Cf. Public Utility
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952).
27. E.g., Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), va-
cated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Salisburg v. Southern New England Tel-
ephone Co., 365 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Conn. 1973); Stanford v. Gas Service Co.,
346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972).
28. A majority of states have now adopted intrastate water quality stand-
ards. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. - (1972), reprinted at [1972]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3671.
29. The state may establish water quality standards pursuant to a public
hearing. See N.Y. ENVI. CoNs. LAW § 17-0301 (McKinney 1973). This
public hearing would not fulfill Substantive Due Process requirements even
if it arguably fulfilled Procedural Due Process requirements. Since one of
the elements of the cause of action is a deprivation of a constitutional right,
the existence of a prior public hearing would not justify the deprivation.
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Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 197230 may confer juris-
diction.31 While this Act authorizes the granting of injunctive re-
lief, a private litigant cannot recover money damages under it.
Common law remedies are not, however, preempted by the stat-
ute3 2 and thus a district court should be able to take pendent juris-
diction over a claim for money damages brought by the party plain-
tiff.3 3  The Act also prohibits representative suits,3 4 thereby bar-
ring a class action under the Act. In a majority of the circuits,
however, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have taken pendent
jurisdiction over claims involving third parties not a party to the
federal cause of action.35 Since a class action for money damages
can be brought as a third-party claim, such a suit should be cogni-
zable in a majority of the circuits, at least until the Supreme Court
rules on appropriateness of pendenting third-party claims.
Class Action Under the Thumb of Zahn
If the class litigant is relegated to bringing the cause under gen-
eral diversity or general federal question jurisdiction, he may well
consider himself under the thumb of Zahn. Luckily, all is not lost,
for there are several potential paths by which the impact of Zahn
can be averted.
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
31. The parties need not be diverse and no amount in controversy need
be alleged. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. 1974).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. 1974).
33. Under the theory of pendent jurisdiction a federal court has discretion
to take subject matter jurisdiction over a non-federal cause of action, when
the court cannot entertain it separately, if it relates to a federal cause of
action before the court. The relation between the two causes of action is
that they must arise out of a "common nucleus of operative fact." United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. 1974).
35. Traditionally, pendent jurisdiction has been found only with respect
to parties properly before the court on the federal cause; it could not be
applied to third parties. This rule has undergone erosion in many of the
circuits where pendent jurisdiction is now being used to confer subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over claims involving third parties not party to the federal
cause of action. E.g., Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800(2d Cir. 1971); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973); Stone v.
Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.
v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1968); Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Insurance
Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1970); Hatridge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court recently had the op-
portunity to decide the question whether pendent jurisdiction can confer
subject matter jurisdiction over a third party. Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693 (1973). After noting that the weight of authority in the circuits
favored granting jurisdiction, the Court declined to decide the point saying
the district court judge, in exercise of legitimate discretion, had properly
disallowed the joinder. 411 U.S. at 715.
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AvOIDING THE IMPACT OF Zahn
Each of the techniques to be examined offer some hope to the
class litigant of circumventing the Zahn decision. The first
method, requesting exemplary damages, is placed first because of
its straightforwardness. The second and third techniques, finding
a common or joint right and requesting injunctive relief, are placed
next because they rely on common concepts and are more useful
than the fourth method, defining the class to eliminate claims of
less than 10,000 dollars. The third technique, seeking injunctive
relief, may very well prove to be the most useful tool of all.
Exemplary Damages
It probably goes without saying that a good faith prayer for
exemplary damages should be made whenever possible since coun-
sel always strives to get the most complete relief for his client. It
is worth recalling, moreover, that exemplary damages may be
added to actual damages in determining whether the amount in
controversy requirement is satisfied.3 6
The question can arise, however, of the proper ratio of actual to
exemplary damages. To illustrate, a claim of 8,000 dollars actual
damages plus 4,000 dollars punitive damages is likely to satisfy most
everyone as meeting the jurisdictional amount as long as punitive
damages are permitted on the cause of action pleaded,3 7 but a claim
of 10 dollars actual damages and 10,000 dollars punitive damages
might well elicit a plea that it was made in bad faith.3 8 The federal
courts have not laid down a mathematical rule as to when the re-
quest for exemplary damages becomes a bad faith claim; the plain-
tiff's claim can be overcome only if it can be shown to a legal cer-
tainty that the amount recoverable is less than the jurisdictional
36. 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 0.93 [4] (2d ed. 1974).
37. Id. See, e.g., Wood v. Stark Tri-County Building Trades Council, 473
F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1973) [a claim for 3,000 dollars actual damages and 7,000
dollars punitive damages was held as satisfying the jurisdictional amount
requirement]; Green v. Keithley, 86 F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1936) [a claim for
1,670 dollars actual damages and 10,000 dollars punitive damages was held
as satisfying the jurisdictional amount requirement of 3,000 dollars].
38. Fleming v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 146 F.2d 128 (5th
Cir. 1944) held that a claim of 103 dollars actual damages and 3,000 dollars
punitive damages against a state sheriff's bond did not satisfy the 3,000 dol-
lar jurisdictional amount requirement because state law required an award
of punitive damages must not be excessive or oppressive.
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amount.39 With such a plaintiff-oriented rule, the class litigant
may well have a potent weapon to combat Zahn in the appropri-
ate case.
Several versus Common Rights
In 1966, the much criticized" old Rule 2341 which attempted to
pigeonhole class actions into "true," "hybrid" or "spurious" classes
gave way to the more functional approach of modern Rule 23. A
major objection to the older rule was that in deciding to which
category the action belonged, the courts had to determine whether
the rights involved were "common" for a true class or "several"
for a hybrid or spurious class. These proved to be elusive terms
for both legal theorists42 and judges.4 3 Under the prior law, claims
could be aggregated by the class members to meet the jurisdictional
amount only if the rights asserted were "common." Even though
not mentioned in modern Rule 23, these terms are now once again
part and parcel of many class action jurisdiction questions. The
Court held that each member of a class must satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement unless the claimants are seeking to en-
force a "common and undivided interest."44
39. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289
(1938).
40. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, SOiE PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, 244-58 (1950); Kap-
lan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 380 (1967);
Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 176 (1969).
41. The old Rule 23 reads in pertinent part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numer-
ous as to make it impractical to bring them all before the court,
such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate repre-
sentation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class
is (1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner
of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of
the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the
action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact af-
fecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 94 (1965).
42. See note 40, supra.
43. See, e.g., Gullo v. Veterans Coop. Housing Ass'n., 13 F.R.D. 11 (D.D.C.
1952); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa.
1939), rev'd, 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 282 (1940), on re-
mand, 39 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1941), rev'd sub nom. Pennsylvania Co. for
Ins. on Lives v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941). See Z. CHAFEE, supra
note 40, at 263-65.
44. 414 U.S. at 294.
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A simple way to skirt this definitional problem has been sug-
gested by Judge Frankel of the Southern District of New York.
He suggests that Rule 23 (b) (1) and (b) (2) class suits embrace the
old "true" and "hybrid" classifications and similarly, that Rule
23(b) (3) class suits correspond to the old "spurious" actions.45
Therefore, he reasons "aggregation may be proper for actions clas-
sified under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), but not under (b) (3)."46
This approach has been criticized, however, since it is generally felt
that class actions meeting the Rule 23(b) (1) or (b) (2) functional
requirements may still involve separate and distinct rights instead
of necessarily common and undivided rights.47
The Supreme Court, although confining the Zahn decision to
Rule 23 (b) (3) class actions, 48 relied so heavily on its finding that
the claims were separate rather than common that one is left with
the impression that the Court has rejected Judge Frankel's sug-
gestion.49 To determine whether each unnamed, as well as named,
member of the class must have a claim meeting the amount in con-
troversy requirement, it must be determined, therefore, whether
the rights asserted are "common" or "several."
The fact that a "common and undivided right" would justify a
"true" class action under old Rule 23 does not help the definitional
problem."0 Professor Moore attempted to define a true class as
follows:
The "true class suit" is one wherein, but for the class action de-
vice, the joinder of all interested persons would be essential. This
would be in cases where the right sought to be enforced was joint,
common or derivative .... 51
But such a definition provides little enlightenment on this difficult
concept and led Professor Chafee to exclaim:
Perhaps I am color-blind with respect to class suits, but I often
45. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43
F.R.D. 39, 43 (1967).
46. Id. at 49.
47. 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.08 at n. 17 (2d ed. 1974). See
also Wright, supra note 40, at 177.
48. 414 U.S. at 301.
49. Id. at 294-98.
50. Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 914 (1949).
51. 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.08 (2d ed. 1974).
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have as much perplexity in telling a "common" right from a "sev-
eral" right as in deciding whether some ties. are green or blue.52
Although the "common" right- "several" right dichotomy is not
generally believed to be precisely definable, the Supreme Court has
asserted:
[The] lower courts have developed largely workable standards
for determining when claims are joint and common, and therefore
entitled to be aggregated, and when they are separate and distinct
and therefore not aggregable. 53
Unfortunately the Court did not refer to any cases where this mat-
ter is so clarified.54
A hazy pattern does seem to emerge from the cases finding a
common interest. As might be expected, a common interest is
found when the plaintiffs are asserting rights in property which
they hold in tenancy in common.55 The common interest for ju-
risdictional purposes, however, is not limited to common ownership
of property. A common interest is also found in those suits resemb-
ling a derivative suit by stockholders. In these suits the plaintiff
cannot sue on his own behalf; he can only assert some right which
is held in' common with others. Bondholder and vendor lien fore-
closures, 56 or contract rights for the benefit of a group 7 are ex-
amples of such common interests. Another common pattern oc-
curs in suits which, if successfully brought in a non-representative
action, could adversely affect the rights of unrepresented parties.
These cases commonly involve a limited fund from which the var-
ious claims can be satisfied.58 Although the pattern associating
these interests is necessarily general, the class litigant may be able
to avoid Zahn where there exists some factor linking the interests
of the parties so that they might be characterized as common in-
terests. Zahn is, of course, an obstacle to the class litigant pressing
a claim sounding in tort and brought by different property owners.
Seeking Injunctive Relief in Addition to Money Damages
By seeking injunctive relief when money damages alone are in-
adequate, as in cases of continuing nuisances or violations of civil
52. Z. CHmAFE, supra note 40, at 257.
53. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969).
54. Id.
55. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Taylor, 115 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1940).
56. Troy Bank v. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911); New Orleans Pa-
cific Ry. Co. v. Parker, 143 U.S. 42 (1891).
57. Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
58. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Coker, 219 F.2d 631 (4th Cir.
1955); Miller v. National City Bank, 147 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1945).
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rights, several new factors must be considered in the determination
of the amount in controversy.
By requesting injunctive relief, the class action can be, of course,
categorized as a Rule 23 (b) (1) or (2) class.59 If the Supreme Court
were to follow Judge Frankel's suggestions that aggregation be per-
mitted for those classes, then Zahn's impact would be easily avoided
if injunctive relief were a proper remedy. As discussed supra, how-
ever, the likelihood of the Court accepting the Judge's suggestions
is not great.60 There is, however, another route by which the ad-
vantages of aggregation can be attained without revising the
Court's thinking on common and several rights.
The federal courts, through the first part of this century, deter-
mined the amount in controversy in cases seeking injunctive relief
by the cost to plaintiff if the injunction were denied or the cost to
defendant if the injunction were granted, whichever was greater.61
This original rule gave way and later cases without expressly over-
ruling the precedents 62 and generally 63 considered the amount in
controversy from the plaintiff's viewpoint only. In a case such as
Zahn, determining the amount in controversy from the defendant's
viewpoint would be nearly, if not equally, as beneficial as aggregat-
ing the class claims. The aggregated value of the injunctive relief
may be greater than the cost to the defendant of complying with
the injunction, but this cost should, in most cases exceed 10,000
dollars.
59. See Biechele v. Norfolk & W.R.R. Co., 309 F. Supp. 354, 355 (N.D.
Ohio 1969).
60. See text accompanying note 49, supra.
61. Mississippi & M.R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 492 (1862)
[held the value of the object which would be removed pursuant to the in-
junction is basis for jurisdiction]; Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual
Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S. 121, 125 (1915) [held that jurisdictional
amount is measured from plaintiff's viewpoint if that is greater than meas-
uring from defendant's viewpoint]. See also 1 R. FosTEr, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 13 (6th ed. 1920). This test may also be successfully applied in certain
cases where injunctive relief is not sought. Cf. Berman v. Narragansett
Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
62. See, e.g., Purcell v. Summers, 126 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 317 U.S. 640 (1942); Minsky's Follies v. Sennes, 206 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1953). See also 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 0.96[2] (2d ed. 1974).
63. Contra, Hatridge v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir.
1969); Ridder Bros. v. Blithern, 142 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944); Ronzio v.
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940).
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The Supreme Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin 4
has recently endorsed the original rule. In Illinois the Court dis-
missed on forum non-conveniens grounds an original action brought
by the State of Illinois to enjoin several Wisconsin municipalities
from polluting Lake Michigan. The Court held that it was not
necessary to bring the case originally to the Supreme Court if this
case satisfied the general federal question jurisdiction require-
ments for a suit brought at the District Court level. In determin-
ing that the amount in controversy requirement was satisfied, the
Court approvingly cited three cases standing for the proposition
that the amount in controversy is measured from the plaintiff's
or defendant's viewpoint, whichever is greater. 5 Despite the fact
that the Court's reaffirmation of the older rule may be dicta, Illi-
nois does provide the class litigant needed ammunition for assert-
ing the reestablishment of the original rule and would, in many
cases, facilitate compliance with the amount in controversy require-
ment if injunctive relief is sought.
A third factor which comes into play when injunctive relief is
sought is suggested by a class action involving air pollution brought
before District Court Judge Young of the Northern District of Ohio.00
Judge Young held that while none of the individual damage claims
could possibly involve 10,000 dollars needed for jurisdiction, that
under the injunctive relief sought "the right of each member of
the class to live in an environment free from excessive coal dust
and conversely, the right of the defendant to operate its coal load-
ing facility are both in excess of" 10,000 dollars, 7 giving the court
jurisdiction. Judge Young neatly avoided the plaintiff's-defend-
ant's viewpoint controversy, but what is more important is that he
felt the value of the injunctive relief to each class member was in
excess of 10,000 dollars.
In theory, the amount in controversy should not be affected if
the plaintiffs are entitled to money damages for the decrease in the
fair market value of the property instead of injunctive relief.08 In
practice, however, a judge may more readily find the jurisdictional
amount satisfied if injunctive relief is sought because his jurisdic-
64. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
65. 406 U.S. at 98. The Court cited Mississippi & M.R. Co. v. Ward, 67
U.S. (2 Black) 485 (1862), Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light,
Heat & Power Co., 239 U.S. 121 (1915) and Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R.
Co., 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940).
66. Biechele v. Norfolk & Western R.R. Co., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio
1969).
67. Id. at 355.
68. Cf. 1 J. Moopx, F~im)ERA PiRucrc. 0.96[2] (2d ed. 1974).
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tional conclusion will not be tested later when the judgment is ren-
dered. Of course, a money judgment for less than the jurisdictional
amount does not void it, but it could cause some criticism. The liti-
gants in this case avoided the problem altogether by requesting
injunctive relief.
Judge Young's decision brings up still another 'factor which
should be considered in determining whether the amount in con-
troversy requirement is satisfied. Judge Young seemed to think
that the amount in controversy must be satisfied for either the le-
gal or the equitable remedy alone. After determining the request
for injunctive relief satisfied the amount in controversy require-
ment, he also took jurisdiction over the claim for money damages
"in the interest of judicial efficiency."69  This "quasi-ancillary"
jurisdiction, it is suggested, is incorrect since money damages and
injunctive relief are merely compatible remedies needed to com-
pensate the plaintiff on his single cause of action. Since a plaintiff
is allowed to aggregate his claims when brought on different causes
of actions, 70 it would seem anomalous to prohibit aggregation-of
compatible, non-alternative, remedies on a single cause of action.7 1
Clearly, then, the value of the injunctive relief should be added to
the actual and exemplary damages to determine whether the
amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.
Limiting the Class to Claimants Having $10,000 Claims
At first glance, limiting the class to only those persons who have
a 10,000 dollar claim seems to be a simple solution. Simple solu-
tions, however, are not always workable solutions. It has been
said that "an essential prerequisite to a class action is the existence
of a class whose bounds are precisely drawn."72  Such a precise
class definition is apparently required because a (b) (3) suit is res
judicata to all members of the class except those who elect to opt-
out73 and the proposed limitation of the class could lead to the side-
69. 309 F. Supp. at 355. Although this case was removed to the District
Court, this fact should not affect the determination whether the amount in
controversy requirement is satisfied.
70. Alberty v. Western, 249 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1958); 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 0.97[1] (2d ed. 1974).
71. 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.97[1] at n.1 (2d ed. 1974).
72. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 491 (1968); 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 23.04 (2d ed. 1974).
73. Rule 23 provides in pertinent part: -
(c) (2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3),
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line sitting or one-way intervention which existed under the old
Rule 23 .7  If the class were limited to those persons having 10,000
dollar claims, a member of the class, whose actual claim amounted
to something greater than the jurisdictional amount, might easily
discover that his damages are somewhat less than the jurisdicitonal
amount if the class action failed in an attempt to avoid its res judi-
cata effects.
An opt-in procedure, which is not authorized by Rule 23, but
which has been utilized in some jurisdictions,75 would eliminate
this one way intervention, especially if those opting-in were re-
quired to demonstrate that their claims were not merely color-
able.76 A requirement of such a demonstration would bring all the
parties before the court, which raises doubt whether class treat-
ment would still be "superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy" as required by
Rule 23. Perhaps this last objection could be overcome if the bona
fides of the claim belonging to the opting-in party were tested only
when that party seeks to enforce the judgment or when the judg-
ment is given res judicata effect.77 In addition, all this assumes, of
course, that a case with numerous parties having 10,000 dollar
claims would arise. That is, at least, an infrequent occurrence.
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude
him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) thejudgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who
do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not re-
quest exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
74. Compare Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1963) with York v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
75. See Biechele v. Norfork & W.R.R. Co., 309 F. Supp. 354, 356 (N.D.
Ohio 1969); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403(S.D. Iowa 1968). An opt-in procedure which seemingly is authorized, is
the dual notice method. Under this method, the first notice is the standard
opt-out notice which is followed by a second notice requiring interested
class members to file a notice of the extent of their claim. The second no-
tice is authorized by 23(d) (2) which permits "for the protection of the
members of the class" notice be given requiring them "to come into the ac-
tion." FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Those members who fail to file claims are dis-
missed. Arey v. Providence Hospital, 55 F.2d 62, 70-72 (D.D.C. 1972); In
Re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267, 271-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452,
459-60 (E.D. Penn. 1968).
76. District Judge Liddy suggested that such a demonstration might be
necessary in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Vt.
1971).
77. See note 75, supra.
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CONCLUSION
Zahn v. International Paper Co. surely increases the difficulty
of bringing a class action suit based on diversity or general federal
jurisdiction due to the requirement that even the unnamed parties
have claims in excess of the 10,000 dollar jurisdictional amount if
the right to be enforced is only a "several" right. With this as a
starting point, it would seem that the (b) (3) class suit is an empty
hulk, an impotent vestige of a system designed to protect the small
guy. Perhaps this is the result the Court intended, having found
that the abuses attendant to the class action device outweigh its
benefits.
This comment proposed several methods by which the class liti-
gant might circumvent the Zahn rule. The best method, if injunc-
tive relief is appropriate, is to assert that, based on the Court's
decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the amount in
controversy should be determined by the cost to plaintiff if the
injunction is refused or cost to defendant if granted, whichever is
greater. This should provide an easy mechanism to overcome Zahn,
but if the driving force behind the Zahn decision was a distrust of
class action litigation, even this method may fail.
Other means of overcoming Zahn include, besides the greater
measure of damages if injunctive relief is sought, establishing a
federal cause of action such as under the Civil Rights Act of 1871
or the Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, increasing the claims
through requests for exemplary damages or limiting the class to
claimants having a legitimate 10,000 dollar claim. All these eva-
sions are, however, vulnerable to a court which is hostile to class
actions in general.
RICHARD P. BERG
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